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The following article is a difficult one. Its unusual style, its sophistica-
tion, and its multilayered patterns of thought make considerable demands
of the reader. We have therefore taken the step, unique for the Journal,
of providing a brief preface.
Constitutional review by the Supreme Court has evoked two great crises
of legitimacy in this century: once, as a reaction to invalidations of New
Deal economic legislation in the 1930's,4 and again in response to the
activist decisions of the Warren Court.' These crises have generated impor-
tant views concerning proper guidelines for the Court; roughly, such views
have focused either on the development of general adjudicatory principles
that are neutral in character' or on the political and institutional role of
the Court in relation to other institutions.d
In an article published six years ago in the Stanford Law Review,' Pro-
fessor Deutsch analyzed the various attempts to formulate successful theories
of constitutional adjudication. He there argued that none of these theories
were satisfactory and concluded by suggesting that a contextual approach
to the question is required.'
In the present piece, Professor Deutsch offers an example of such an
approach. Examining the Florida Lime & Avocado Growers litigation,
t Professor of Law, Yale University.
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we are carefully taken through varying arrangements of the facts, from dif-
ferent perspectives, as legal issues emerge from the factual configuration.
The propositions which may be said to underlie this examination are: (1)
No comprehensive, normative theory can be stated which will guide the
Court in reaching a decision. (2) The act of the Court is to employ the
conceptual tool of precedent in order to choose among various plausible
grounds of decision. (3) Precedent is more importantly prospective rather
than retrospective; therefore the judicial activity is to attempt to anticipate
the future relevance of the present decision and the language in which it is
framed. (4) On the success of this activity depends the Court's legitimacy.
We offer a crude example to contrast the critical underpinnings of Pro-
fessor Deutsch's view with some of those alluded to above. Consider the
recent DeFunis decision" by the Supreme Court. It makes a difference
which of the following prescriptions one applies: (a) The Court correctly
disposed of the case on the mootness issue, for it is a general principle that
the Court will not render an advisory opinion. Moreover, similar previous
cases in which a defendant had privately agreed to grant effective (although
not complete) relief to the plaintiff have been held moot. (b) The insti-
tutional competence of the Court and the fact that it is not democratically
chosen properly impelled the Court to choose the better part of valor. The
political sense that a decision on the merits would lead to an invalidation
of many recent executive and legislative efforts or a vitiation of the Court's
own ringing statements on the suspect nature of racial classifications coun-
seled the same course. (c) Because the Court simply could not anticipate
the applications of such a decision, particularly in an area of rapid flux,
it appropriately elected to avoid decision, to avoid the creation of precedent.
But this is crude. It omits the feelings of what is meet and right which
imbue the traditional expositions of (a); notably absent from (b) are the
subtle characterizations and sound common sense which mark the writers
of that view; straying from the factual context distorts the fundamental
tenets of (c). This last brings us to comment on the intricate methodology
Professor Deutsch employs in the following article.
His method-the constant, repeated forcing of the reader into consid-
erations of the fact pattern, while eschewing the statement of points or
directions or conclusions or even opinion-is required by Professor Deutsch's
epistemological conviction that universals cannot be stated. It implies a
rejection of the two poles of the Holmes epigram about logic and experi-
ence' (which terms Professor Deutsch has used to characterize the two
competing points of view'), and it forbids the dichotomies, definitions, and
guidelines which are the prominent characteristics of a body of expository
literature that tries to state rules rather than show them. It is a demanding
methodk and the Editors, being bound by no such philosophical restraints,
h. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974).
i. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Howe ed. 1963).
j. See Deutsch, supra note e, at 229-35.
k. Compare the method of L. AVITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESIGATIONS (3d ed.
1958). See id. at 50e.
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have occasionally added notes to aid the reader in working through the
exercise Professor Deutsch has provided.
The cases to be examined arose out of efforts by Florida avocado growers
to have enjoined the enforcement of a California statute. The statute, de-
signed to prevent the sale of immature avocados, forbade the marketing in
California of avocados with less than a designated oil content. It thus ap-
plied a different maturity test from that established by federal regulation,
the state's test apparently being more difficult for Florida avocados to
satisfy. The challenge reached the Supreme Court twice in the early 1960's;
the statute was not overturned.' A federal district court finally declared it
unconstitutional in 1973, holding that it unreasonably burdened interstate
commerce."' This is a series of cases that is ideal both for Professor Deutsch's
method and his examination of precedent, for it allows the reader to begin
in nedias res with a fact pattern that is involved in both an earlier case
and a subsequent one.
Of course, to urge a judge to consider tile future relevance of his decision
is hardly news, but then neither is it novel to propose that his decisions be
principled, or made with an awareness of the role of the institution of
which he is a part. Legal writing is not discovery, it is emphasis. Professor
Deutsch's proposal that a decision should be seen primarily as the creation
of precedent does represent a radical view, and it has substantial jurispru-
dential implications." The theory presented is one that recasts the initial
question concerning appropriate guidelines for the Court, and asks of us,
if we are unsatisfied by the answer offered, whether anything more can
be said.
-The Editors
I. The Lesson of Law: On the Cost of Contextual Concreteness
Imagine: the last meeting of a class in constitutional law. The pro-
fessor speaks:
The shortest way to define what it is I hope we accomplish today is
that our discussion will demonstrate what I have frequently argued in
earlier classes: that the value of the system of common law adjudica-
tion inheres in its success in accomplishing the necessary but impos-
sible feat of defining relevance.' Precedent, as we have previously
agreed, is a prior decision that constitutes a relevant analogy to the
situation before the court. The hope, therefore, is that today's case
will be relevant.
1. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73 (1960); Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
m. J.R. Brooks & Son, Inc. v. Reagan, Civ. No. C-71-1311 SC (N.D. Cal., Sept. 18, 1973).
n. See, e.g., Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of
Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 962, 1015-17 (1973).
1. See Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. Rv. 169, 205 (1968).
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We are discussing today Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, Director of the Department of Agriculture of California.
2 I
assume we all agree that what this case is about is accurately described
by the first paragraph of the majority opinion:
Section 792 of California's Agricultural Code, which gauges the
maturity of avocados by oil content, prohibits the transportation
or sale in California of avocados which contain "less than 8 per
cent of oil by weight ... excluding the skin and seed." In contrast,
federal marketing orders approved by the Secretary of Agriculture
gauge the maturity of avocados grown in Florida by standards
which attribute no significance to oil content. This case presents
the question of the constitutionality of the California statute inso-
far as it may be applied to exclude from California markets certain
Florida avocados which, although certified to be mature under
the federal regulations, do not uniformly meet the California re-
quirement of 8% of oil.3
Your suggestion that the case is a simple one-that the California
law represents a clear violation of the Commerce Clause-is not only
interesting, but also backed by authority. Unfortunately, however, the
authority is not that of the majority of the Court. Indeed, Mr. Justice
White in dissent, joined by Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas,
and Mr. Justice Clark, did not even reach the issue: "Since we in the
minority have concluded that the Agricultural Adjustment Act and
regulations promulgated thereunder leave no room for this incon-
sistent and conflicting state legislation, we reach only the Supremacy
Clause issue."
4
Nor does the suggestion of the Supremacy Clause as a ground for
decision fare much better, since it was the dissent which noted that:
The ultimate question for the Court is whether the California
law may validly apply to Florida avocados which the Secretary or
his inspector says are mature under the federal scheme. We in the
minority believe that it cannot, for in our view the California
law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davido-
witz, 312 U.S. 52, 67.r
2. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
3. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 133-34 (1963) (footnotes
omitted).
4. Id. at 160 (dissenting opinion).
5. Id. at 165 (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted).
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The majority notes in this connection:
That the California statute and the federal marketing orders
embody different maturity tests is clear. However, this difference
poses, rather than disposes of the problem before us. Whether a
State may constitutionally reject commodities which a federal
authority has certified to be marketable depends upon whether
the state regulation "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,"
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67.6
What, then, is the situation concerning this California statute? The
majority's view is that:
The California statute was enacted in 1925. Like the federal
marketing regulations applicable to appellants, this statute sought
to ensure the maturity of avocados reaching retail markets. The
District Court found on sufficient evidence that before 1925 the
marketing of immature avocados had created serious problems in
California. An avocado, if picked prematurely, will not ripen
properly, but will tend to decay or shrivel and become rubbery
and unpalatable after purchase. Not only retail consumers but
even experienced grocers have difficulty in distinguishing mature
avocados from the immature by physical characteristics alone.
Thus, the District Court concluded, "[t]he marketing of . . .
[immature] avocados cheats the consumer" and adversely affects
demand for and orderly distribution of the fruit. 197 F.Supp.,
at 783.7
And the dissent's:
The California statute was enacted in 1925, when, according to
the District Court, practically all the avocados in the United
States came from that state. 197 F.Supp., at 782. The purpose of
this legislation was to prevent the marketing of immature avo-
cados, which never ripen properly, but decay or shrivel up and
become rubbery and unpalatable after purchase by the consumer.
Ibid. The effect of marketing immature avocados is to "cheat the
consumer," and thus have "a bad [economic] effect upon retailers
and producers as a whole, since it increases future sales resistance"
against buying avocados. Id., at 783.
In 1925, when the state law was enacted, most of the avocados
grown in California were, as they are at the present time, from
6. Id. at 141.
7. Id. at 137-38 (footnotes omitted).
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trees derived from Mexican varieties. Such avocados contain at
least 8% oil when mature. The Florida avocado growers, however,
the only substantial competitors of the California growers, 197
F.Supp., at 787, n. 8, depend in substantial part on trees of non-
Mexican parentage. The Florida avocados involved here, hybrid
and Guatemalan varieties, may reach maturity and be acceptable
for marketing, at least under federal standards, prior to reaching
an 8% oil content.
8
Since the majority does not dispute9 the dissent's contention that
"[t]here is no health interest here. The question is, as the District
Court recognized, 197 F.Supp., at 782-783, a purely economic one: the
marketing of immature avocados, which do not ripen properly after
purchase by the consumer but instead shrivel up and decay, has a
substantial adverse effect on consumer demand for avocados,"'" per-
haps the issue was best put in the majority opinion as follows:
Although Florida and California were competitors in avocado
production when the statute was passed in 1925, the present rec-
ord permits no inference that the California statute had a dis-
criminatory objective.
[footnote] The District Court assumed that in 1925 California
growers faced no meaningful competition from Florida growers.
It appears, however, that the Florida industry was well developed
when the California industry was in its infancy, see Collins, The
Avocado, A Salad Fruit From the Tropics (U.S. Dept. of Agricul-
ture Bureau of Plant Industry, Bull. No. 77, 1905), 35-36. Not
only does there appear to have been vigorous competition between
Florida and California producers for all markets in 1925, see
Popenoe, The Avocado-California vs. Florida, 61 California
Cultivator, Nov. 3, 1923, p. 459; but in some years during the
1920's the Florida production exceeded that of California. See
Traub [et al., Avocado Production in the United States (U.S. Dept.
of Agriculture Circular No. 620, 1941)] at 2. See generally
Hodgson, [The California Avocado Industry (Calif. Agricultural
Extension Service Circular No. 43, 1930)], at 60, 82-83.
The passage of the California statute was immediately and vig-
orously protested by Florida producers, and a United States Sen-
ator from Florida filed an informal complaint with the Depart-
ment of Agriculture, see, e.g., California Avocado Law Unfair to
Florida: New Pacific Coast Maturity Standards Practically Ban
All Shipments from this State, 32 Florida Grower, Nov. 7, 1925,
8. Id. at 160-61 (dissenting opinion) (footnotes omitted).
9. See id. at 137 nA.
10. Id. at 168-69 (dissenting opinion).
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pp. 4, 22. See also id., Nov. 21, 1925, p. 15. Even in California
there was contemporaneous recognition that passage of the statute
severely restricted the access of Florida growers to the markets at
least of Northern California, see Hodgson, The Florida Avocado
Industry-A Survey II, 66 California Cultivator, June 26, 1926,
pp. 721, 743. And see 80 American Fruit Grower, Feb. 1960, p. 64.
On the other hand, there have been suggestions that neither
the adoption nor the application of the California statute reflected
any discriminatory or anticompetitive purpose. In some years,
California growers themselves experience great difficulty meet-
ing the oil content requirement, and sizable shipments must be
destroyed-see Demand for Avocados, 74 California Cultivator,
Feb. 8, 1930, p. 167; Roche, Look Out for Immature Avocados,
87 California Cultivator, Nov. 2, 1940, p. 590; California Avo-
cado Assn., 1937 Yearbook (1937), 88-even though the oil con-
tent of mature California avocados in good years runs substan-
tially above 8%, see Traub, supra, . . . at 6-8. Moreover, the Cali-
fornia Growers' Association has regarded its ability to market
Florida fruit during the months when California fruit is not
available as strengthening rather than weakening its own market
position. See Fourteenth Annual Report of the General Manager
of the Calavo Growers of California (1937), 20. Plainly the ques-
tions indicated by these conflicting materials can be resolved only
at a trial fully developing the Commerce Clause issue. [end foot-
note]
The District Court ... concluded that the California oil con-
tent test was not burdensome upon or discriminatory against
interstate commerce. 197 F.Supp., at 786-787. However, we are
unable to review that conclusion or decide whether the court
properly applied the principles announced in these [precedents]
because we cannot ascertain what constituted the record on which
the conclusion was predicated. Much of the appellants' offered
proof consisted of depositions and exhibits, designed to detail
both the rejection of Florida avocados in California and the oil
content of Florida avocados which had met the federal test but
which might nonetheless have been excluded from California
markets."1
If that really is an accurate description of the situation before the
Court, however, it should by now be apparent that substance has once
again become inextricably intertwined with procedure, and how im-
portant the decision in the companion case, Paul v. Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc.,12 was in terms of the case we are presently
11. Id. at 153-54 & n.19.
12. Id. at 157.
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considering. Thus, there is no dissent from the holding in that com-
panion case that:
In No. 49, the state officers cross-appeal on the ground that
the District Court should have dismissed the action for want of
equity, rather than for lack of merit. Their contention is that
there was insufficient showing of injury to the Florida growers
to invoke the District Court's equity jurisdiction. We reject that
contention, and affirm the judgment insofar as it is challenged by
the cross-appeal.
In Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., v. Jacobsen, 362
U.S. 73, we held that because of the Florida growers' allegations
that California officials had consistently condemned Florida avo-
cados as unfit for sale in California, "thus requiring appellants
[the Florida growers]-to prevent destruction and complete loss
of the shipments-to reship the avocados to and sell them in other
states," it was evident that "there is an existing dispute between
the parties as to present legal rights amounting to a justiciable
controversy which appellants are entitled to have determined on
the merits," 362 U.S., at 85-86. In view of our mandate in Jacob-
sen, therefore, the District Court necessarily assumed jurisdiction
and heard the case on its merits.
13
What the Jacobsen opinion actually focuses on, however, is that
"[t]he first and principal question presented is whether this action is
one required by [the relevant statute14] to be heard by a District
Court of three judges and, hence, whether we have jurisdiction of
this direct appeal . . ."15 And what it concludes is that the relevant
statute "seems rather plainly to indicate a congressional intention to
require an application for an injunction to be heard and determined
by a court of three judges in any case in which the injunction may be
granted on grounds of federal unconstitutionality."' 6
A Frankfurter dissent, joined in by Mr. Justice Douglas, is based
on the consideration that:
13. Id.
14. [Editors' note] 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970):
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation
or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such
State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made by an
administrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not be granted
by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality
of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a
district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title.
15. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 75 (1960).
16. Id. at 76-77.
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I deem regard for [the] demands which the three-judge require-
ment makes upon the federal judiciary to be the jurisdictional
consideration of principal importance in a case such as this where
a claim is seriously urged which necessarily involves, certainly in
the first instance, construction of local or federal statutes, thus
making potentially available a non-constitutional ground on
which the case may be disposed of. It is more important that the
ordinary operation of our judicial system not be needlessly dis-
rupted by such a case than it is to insure that every case which
may turn out to be constitutional be heard by three judges. I am
led therefore to construe strictly the statutes providing the three-
judge procedure relevant to this case so as to permit their invoca-
tion only when the claim is solely constitutional, thus tending to
insure that the three-judge procedure will not be extended to
non-constitutional cases not within its proper sphere. 1"
What makes the Jacobsen decision' s so relevant to the case under
discussion is that:
In chronological sequence, the course of the litigation [in Paul]
was as follows: Trial before United States Circuit Judge Bone, and
United States District Judges Goodman and Halbert was heard
February 7 and 8, 1961.... A memorandum and order announc-
ing judgment for appellees was signed by the three judges and
was filed July 12, 1961.... United States District Judge Louis E.
Goodman died on September 15, 1961 .... The Order Re Plain-
tiffs' Motion to Substitute and Ruling on Evidentiary Matters,
and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed by
Judge Bone and Judge Halbert, and were filed September 21,
1961. The judgment, dismissing appellants' action, signed by
Judge Bone and Judge Halbert, was entered September 22, 1961.19
17. Id. at 93 (dissenting opinion).
18. Cf. Hagans v. Lavine, 94 S. Ct. 1372, 1382-83 (1974):
It is true that the constitutional claim would warrant convening a three-judge
court and that if a single judge rejects the statutory claim, a three-judge court
must be called to consider the constitutional issue. Nevertheless, the coincidence of
a constitutional and statutory claim should not automatically require a single-judge
district court to defer to a three-judge panel, which . . . could then merely pass
the statutory claim back to the single judge .... In fact, it would be grossly
inefficient to send a three-judge court a claim which will only be sent immediately
back. This inefficiency is especially apparent if the single judge's decision resolves
the case, for there is then no need to convene the three-judge court." Norton v.
Richardson, 352 F. Supp. 596, 599 (D.C. Md. 1972) (citations omitted). Section 2281
does not forbid this practice, and we are not inclined to read that statute "in
isolation with mutilating literalness. ... Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.
v. Jacobsen, supra, 362 U.S., at 94 ... (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
19. Appellees' Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at 13-14, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
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As a result:
The parties' own assumptions concerning the content of the
record are in irreconcilable conflict: the appellants have argued
the case on the apparent assumption that the depositions and ex-
hibits were admitted before the District Court; the appellees,
on the other hand, have assumed both in their briefs and in oral
argument that the disputed evidence was not admitted. This lack
of consensus is altogether understandable in light of the confu-
sion created by the District Court's evidentiary rulings: The ap-
pellees objected to the introduction of the disputed materials on
several grounds, both during and after the trial. The court ex-
pressly reserved its rulings on the issue of admissibility, and after
the entry of its order on the merits of the case made a supplemen-
tal "ruling on evidentiary matters," in which it stated that the
disputed exhibits and depositions "are not admitted into evidence,
but have been considered by the Court as an offer of proof by
the plaintiffs ...... The earlier memorandum of the court ex-
plained that it would "assume, arguendo, that the exhibits and
depositions offered by plaintiffs are all admissible." 197 F.Supp.,
at 782. If this was intended to mean that appellants would not
have made out a case for relief, even were the evidence to be ad-
mitted, then there would have been no need to rule on admis-
sibility. But we are unable to determine, just as the parties were
unable to agree, whether the District Court viewed the evidence
in that posture.
[footnote] At the very close of the trial, two of the three mem-
bers of the court offered inconsistent views when appellees' coun-
sel asked for clarification concerning the status of appellants'
disputed depogitions and exhibits. One member of the court re-
plied that "your objections stand to every word that is in these
depositions here," while another responded, "[t]hey are all in
evidence subject to your objections and the Court will rule on
them when it makes its ruling in the case if it is necessary."
20
It was the insistence upon the three-judge procedure, in short, that
forced both the Jacobsen and the Paul Court to remand for a new
trial. We have, of course, agreed at various points during this term
that a successful insistence on correct procedure may prove pyrrhic2
20. 373 U.S. at 155 & n.20 (1963).
21. Cf. id. at 175-76 (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted):
Even if the California oil test were an acceptable test for the maturity of the
Florida avocados, which the Secretary found it was not, the cumulative application
of that test solely for the purpose of a second check on the maturity of Florida
avocados, solely to catch possible errors in the federal scheme, would prove only
that the particular avocados actually tested (and thereby destroyed) were immature,
and it would not justify the rejection of whole lots from which these samples came.
If Florida avocados are to be subjected to this test, the alternatives are to leave
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if the cost constitutes a substantive error.22 In Paul, however, which
is, after all, the case under discussion, the procedural dispute seems
focused on the substantive issue of the division of commercial power
between state and federal authority.
Thus, it is the majority's view that:
An examination of the operation of these particular marketing
orders reinforces the conclusion we reach from [an] analysis of
the terms and objectives of the [congressional] statute. The regu-
lations show that the Florida avocado maturity standards are
drafted each year not by impartial experts in Washington or even
in Florida, but rather by the South Florida Avocado Administra-
tive Committee, which consists entirely of representatives of the
growers and handlers concerned. It appears that the Secretary of
Agriculture has invariably adopted the Committee's recommenda-
tions for maturity dates, sizes, and weights. Thus the pattern
which emerges is one of maturity regulations drafted and admin-
istered locally by the growers' own representatives, and designed
to do no more than promote orderly competition among the
South Florida growers.
23
The dissent, on the other hand, stresses that:
The State may have a legitimate economic interest in the sub-
ject matter, but it is adequately served by the federal regulations
and this interest would be but slightly impaired, if at all, by the
supersession of § 792.
[footnote] It is suggested that the regulations involved here are
"simply schemes for regulating competition among growers . . .
initiated and administered by the growers and shippers them-
selves." From this proposition it is in some way reasoned that
"the self-help standards of this marketing program" should not
be deemed to preclude application of state law which conflicts
with and interferes with the operation of the comprehensive fed-
eral marketing program. The "simply" part of the proposition
the California market to the California producers (at least, to producers of Mexican
varieties) or else, in order to avoid the hazard of rejection, to leave the Florida avo-
cados on the trees past the normal (and federally prescribed) picking date, thereby
shortening the post-picking marketing period and thus frustrating the federal
scheme aimed at moving avocados mature under federal standards into all interstate
markets. A reasonable balancing of the state and federal interests at stake here
requires that the former give way as too insubstantial to warrant frustration of the
congressional purpose.
22. Cf. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. at 86:
MR. JusTicE DoUcAs joins in the part of the opinion that passes on the merits,
the Court having held, contrary to his view, that the case is properly here on di-
rect appeal from a three-judge court.
23. 373 U.S. at 150-51 (footnotes omitted).
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overlooks, however, the fact that these are the Secretary's regula-
tions, promulgated under congressional authority. It also over-
looks the Secretary's extensive supervisory powers and his statutory
duty. . . to insure that regulations be carried on "in the public
interest." And no case has been cited to us which indicates that
the delegation to the regulatees of the power to propose regula-
tions in the first instance violates any provision of general law.
2 '
In terms of precedent, what comes to mind when delegation is men-
tioned is the decision in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan. That case in-
volved the question whether a statutory provision which "purports
to authorize the President to pass a prohibitory law' '25 constituted "an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power." 20
The subject to which this authority relates is defined. It is the
transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum
and petroleum products which are produced or withdrawn from
storage in excess of the amount permitted by state authority. As-
suming for the present purpose, without deciding, that the Con-
gress has power to interdict the transportation of that excess in
interstate and foreign commerce, the question whether .that trans-
portation shall be prohibited by law is obviously one of legisla-
tive policy. Accordingly, we look to the statute to see whether the
Congress has declared a policy with respect to that subject; whether
the Congress has set up a standard for the President's action;
whether the Congress has required any finding by the President
in the exercise of the authority to enact the prohibition.
2 7
After finding that no statutory "provisions can be deemed to pre-
scribe any limitation of the grant of authority,"28 the Court noted
that "[t]he question whether such a delegation of legislative power is
permitted by the Constitution is not answered by the argument that
24. Id. at 177 SL n.20 (dissenting opinion). See also id. at 169 (dissenting opinion):
Despite the repeated suggestions to this effect in the Court's opinion, there is
no indication that the state regulatory scheme has any purpose other than pro-
tecting the good will of the avocado industry-such as protecting health or pre-
venting deception of the public-unless as a purely incidental by-product. Similar
findings on damage to the industry because some growers marketed immature
avocados are contained in the United States Department of Agriculture order
which preceded the issuance of the federal regulations. . . . These two regulatory
schemes have precisely the same purpose, which is purely an economic one; they
seek to achieve it, however, by applying different tests to the same avocados.
25. 293 U.S. 388, 414 (1935).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 414-15.
28. Id. at 420.
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it should be assumed that the President has acted, and will act, for
what lie believes to be the public good. The point is not one of mo-
tives but of constitutional authority, for which the best of motives is
not a substitute." 29 As a result, it concluded that it was compelled to
hold the challenged Executive Orders and administrative regulations
unconstitutional, because a failure to do so would mean that "[i]nstead
of performing its law-making function, the Congress could at will
and as to such subjects as it chose transfer that function to the Presi-
dent or other officer or to an administrative body." 30
Given the teaching of that decision, it seems to me less important-
in connection with the case we are considering today-that a three-
judge district court has recently concluded as a matter of law that:
Were it not for the United States Supreme Court decision in
Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 112 [sic] (1963), we
would conclude that: the application of [the relevant section of
the] California Agricultural Code . . . to Florida avocados pre-
viously certified as mature under the Federal Marketing Order,
violates the Supremacy Clause. 31
and that:
The application of the California statute to Florida avocados
discriminates against Florida avocados and unreasonably burdens
interstate marketing of Florida avocados in violation of the Com-
merce Clause.32
than that it found as a matter of fact that:
In the fall of 1963, when California's Bureau of Standardization
relaxed inspection standards and permitted the entry of some
Florida avocados when the samples tested averaged less than 8
percent oil, the California industry brought immediate pressure
on the State to enforce the 8 percent standard against "all im-
ported avocados" to protect the California growers from competi-




30. Id. at 430.
31. J.R. Brooks & Son, Inc. v. Reagan, Civ. No. C-71-1311 SC, at 17-18 (N.D. Cal.,
Sept. 18, 1973).
32. Id. at 18.
33. .d. at 8.
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and that:
In 1968, a provision was added to the California Administrative
Code, purportedly to enforce the 8 percent statute, to the effect
that, if any single avocado in a lot tested less than 7 percent oil,
the entire lot would be rejected.3 4
The question presented, then-whether the delay was a justifiable
one-is not, for all its procedural clarity, a question without consid-
erable meaning, for it searches precisely the efficacy of reliance on
precedent: the significance of the difference between acting as an
administrator, who has detailed and comprehensive rules on which
to rely, and a judge, who has only precedent.
As to whether it is worth bearing the cost of the delay, in other
words, the only conclusion I can offer is that if we know the answers
to the questions being asked, then of course there exists no valid rea-
son why implementation of our conclusions should not be as rapid
and efficient as possible. But if the law is being asked to provide
satisfactory3 5 solutions to unanswerable questions, then precedent,
rather than rule, is the only tool in terms of which the creation of
responsive answers can be accomplished. 36
34. Id. Another of the judicial findings of fact was that the relevant section of the
California Agricultural Code "arbitrarily and unreasonably burdens interstate commerce
in Florida avocados by imposing a standard which is irrational as applied to Florida
avocados." Id. at 160. Cf. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. at
146 n.14:
It might also be argued that the California statute having been designed to test
the maturity only of California avocados, bears no rational relationship to the
marketability of Florida fruit. Such a contention would seem untenable, however,
in the face of the District Court's express finding of fact, supportable on the testi-
mony before it, that "[a] standard requiring a minimum of 8% of oil in an avo-
cado before it may be marketed is scientifically valid as applied to hybrid and
Guatemalan varieties of avocados grown in Florida and marketed in California."
35. See 373 U.S. at 156 & n.21:
Thus the only evidence which would seem to support an injunction on the
ground of burden on interstate commerce has never been formally admitted to
the record in this case. For this Court to reverse and order an injunction on the
basis of that evidence would be, in effect, to admit the contested depositions and
exhibits on appeal without ever affording the appellees an opportunity to argue
their seemingly substantial objections.
[footnote] Specifically, appellees offered to show that in measuring the oil con-
tent of avocados the Florida experimental test procedures did not employ the same
equipment as is used in California, the former, so it was contended, extracting
less oil than the California equipment would obtain from the same avocado. They
claimed that the average variation amounted to a failure of the Florida equipment
to remove 2.9% of the oil from the fruit, and, further, that the Florida results were
erratic. In addition, appellees asserted that the avocados used in the Florida ex-
periments were not representative of the graded, sized, and inspected fruit that ap-
pellants would normally market.
36. Id. at 165 n.ll (dissenting opinion):
"There is not-and from the very nature of the problem there cannot be-any
rigid formula or rule which can be used as a universal pattern to determine the
meaning and purpose of every act of Congress. This Court, in considering the
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I should clarify the reference in note 1 which directed the reader
to an article that is the critical complement of the present noncritical,
theoretical piece. That article was about various theories of constitu-
tional law; it attempted to show that all of these theories were in fact
playing a game whose rules assumed, wrongly, a dichotomy between
fact and principle. The Lesson is to play a different game: to dem-
onstrate that if law is a science at all it is a science of context, and
that awareness of context is necessary to move from fact to decision.
To demonstrate the proposition that facts themselves are matters
of context and to display the theoretical implications of this proposi-
tion are the functions served by examining what Felix Frankfurter
thought about law. And that thought is presented in the form of com-
mentary on the same material dealt with in the Lesson, precisely be-
cause Justice Frankfurter was himself a player of the same erroneous
game, defined in terms of "role" and "principle."
II. Several Judicial Decades in Search of a Pattern: A Fable
A
Imagine this scene: a Friday meeting in the Conference Room of
the Supreme Court of the United States. Arguments have been heard
on January 8, 1963, in cases No. 45, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, Director of the Department of Agriculture of California,
and No. 49, Paul, Director of the Department of Agriculture of Cali-
fornia v. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.; the opinion is to ap-
pear at 373 U.S. 132 (1963). When those cases are reached for discus-
sion, imagine that the recently retired37 Felix Frankfurter 38 enters the
validity of state laws in the light of .. . federal laws touching the same subject,
has made use of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the
field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment;
and interference. But none of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional
test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be
no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula. Our primary function is to deter-
mine whether, under the circumstances of this particular case, Pennsylvania's law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67. (Emphasis added.)
37. Mr. Justice Frankfurter retired effective August 28, 1962. 371 U.S. VII (1962).
38. [Editors' note] It is important to note that the character, Justice Frankfurter,
is not a surrogate for Professor Deutsch. The former Justice accepted the established
framing of the question of adjudication, and he believed that principles, as answers,
could be given. Rather, he appears to have been chosen to guide us through the
Fable because he frequently and eloquently discussed the use of precedent by the
Court. See, e.g., pp. 1569-70 infra. And perhaps Justice Frankfurter is chosen be-
cause he once wrote of the judge's need and desire "to pierce the curtain of the future."
F. FRANFFURTER, The Judicial Process and the Supreme Court, in OF LAw AND MEN
31, 39 (Elman ed. 1956).
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room. Alone among the players, but like the reader, the former Justice
knows the future history of the Court, and of this litigation, to the
present. He speaks:
I assume we all agree that what this case is about is accurately de-
scribed by the first paragraph of the majority opinion:
Section 792 of California's Agricultural Code, which gauges
the maturity of avocados by oil content, prohibits the transporta-
tion or sale in California of avocados which contain "less than 8
per cent of oil by weight . . .excluding the skin and seed." In
contrast, federal marketing orders approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture gauge the maturity of avocados grown in Florida by
standards which attribute no significance to oil content. This case
presents the question of the constitutionality of the California stat-
ute insofar as it may be applied to exclude from California markets
certain Florida avocados which, although certified to be mature
under the federal regulations, do not uniformly meet the Califor-
nia requirement of 8% of oil.39
I recognize, of course, that a great many issues involving constitu-
tional provisions other than the Commerce Clause have been raised in
this case, including claims based on the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supremacy Clause.
As to the former, however, as the majority notes:
It might also be argued that the California statute, having been
designed to test the maturity only of California avocados, bears
no rational relationship to the marketability of Florida fruit. Such
a contention would seem untenable, however, in the face of the
District Court's express finding of fact, supportable on the testi-
mony before it, that "[a] standard requiring a minimum of 8% of
oil in an avocado before it may be marketed is scientifically valid
as applied to hybrid and Guatemalan varieties of avocados grown
in Florida and marketed in California. ' 40
And as to the latter:
That the California statute and the federal marketing orders
embody different maturity tests is clear. However, this difference
poses, rather than disposes of the problem before us. Whether a
State may constitutionally reject commodities which a federal
authority has certified to be marketable depends upon whether
39. 373 U.S. at 133-34 (footnotes omitted).
40. Id. at 146 n.14 (emphasis in original). See also note 35 supra and p. 1570 infra.
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the state regulation "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,"
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67.41
The dissent, furthermore, agrees that it is only "[s]ince we in the
minority have concluded that the Agricultural Adjustment Act and
regulations promulgated thereunder leave no room for this incon-
sistent and conflicting state legislation [that] we reach only the Su-
premacy Clause issue."
42
Moreover, as I noted almost a generation ago, "[h]ad Marshall pur-
sued the line of least resistance, he would have disposed of Gibbons v.
Ogden, once he found a conflict between the New York and federal
statutes, upon the supremacy which the Constitution explicitly gives
to 'the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof.' -43
Few problems in the unfolding of American constitutional law
are psychologically more tantalizing than ascertainment of the
influences which render some tentative ideas abortive and give en-
during life to others. And as to the ideas that survive, it is seldom
possible to discover the extent to which their consequences were
intended or fortuitous. What Marshall merely adumbrated in
Gibbons v. Ogden became central to our whole constitutional
scheme: the doctrine that the commerce clause, by its own force
and without national legislation, puts it into the power of the
Court to place limits upon state authority. Of course, national
self-consciousness has been with us a developing feeling, and the
fluctuation of emphasis on central government or states has not
yet spent its force. Marshall's use of the commerce clause greatly
41. Id. at 141.
42. Id. at 160 (dissenting opinion). See also id. at 175-76 (footnote omitted):
Even if the California oil test were an acceptable test for the maturity of the
Florida avocados, which the Secretary found it was not, the cumulative application
of that test solely for the purpose of a second check on the maturity of Florida
avocados, solely to catch possible errors in the federal scheme, would prove only
that the particular avocados actually tested (and thereby destroyed) were immature,
and it would not justify the rejection of whole lots from which these samples came.
If Florida avocados are to be subjected to this test, the alternatives are to leave the
California market to the California producers (at least, to producers of Mexican
varieties) or else, in order to avoid the hazard of rejection, to leave the Florida
avocados on the trees past the normal (and federally prescribed) picking date,
thereby shortening the post-picking marketing period and thus frustrating the
federal scheme aimed at moving avocados mature under federal standards into all
interstate markets. A reasonable balancing of the state and federal interests at
stake here requires that the former give way as too insubstantial to warrant frus-
tration of the congressional purpose.
43. F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE
23 (1937) (footnote omitted), discussing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Compare the discussion of "the Grand Style" in K. LLEWELLYN, THE COstasON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING ArPRAiLs 62-72 (1960).
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furthered the idea that though we are a federation of states we
are also a nation, and gave momentum to the doctrine that state
authority must be subject to such limitations as the Court finds
it necessary to apply for the protection of the national community.
It was an audacious doctrine, which, one may be sure, would
hardly have been publicly avowed in support of the adoption
of the Constitution.
44
It thus seems to me not unimportant that the last sentence in the
dissent's last footnote is devoted to denying the majority's "suggestion
*.. that the doctrine of Gibbons v. Ogden is limited to carriers .... "-
Indeed, to speak more generally, it still seems to me to be true, as
I pointed out in the introduction to my lectures on The Commerce
Clause Under Marshall, Taney and Waite, that although "[t]he re-
duction of history to the efforts of a very few personalities is an ex-
pression of the ineradicable romantic element in man. We want to
dramatize life, and also to simplify it,"4, it is even more important that:
Often the intellectual history of a gTeat judge before his ap-
pointment is largely unrecoverable. The intimacies of the confer-
ence room-the workshop of the living Constitution-are illumi-
nations denied to the historian. 47 And it is not easy to disentangle
individual influences in the combined work of a Court. But living
long with opinions, as with other literary forms, conveys accents
and nuances which the ear misses on a single reading, and reveals
meaning in silences.
48
In this case, moreover, as the briefs and a perusal of the trial record
indicate, the parties have each adopted contradictory views of the
evidentiary record.49
B
At this point, the former Justice wearies and impatiently says: The
answer to the question why you should listen to me is that it is now
given me to see into the future. And what I see is that almost precisely
44. F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 43, at 18-19.
45. 373 U.S. at 178 n.21 (dissenting opinion).
46. F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 43, at 5-6.
47. [Editors' note] Cf. Deutsch, supra note 1, at 259-60.
48. F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 43, at 9.
49. See 373 U.S. at 156 (footnote omitted):
Thus the only evidence which would seem to support an injunction on the
ground of burden on interstate commerce has never been formally admitted to
the record in this case. For this Court to reverse and order an injunction on the
basis of that evidence would be, in effect, to admit the contested depositions and
exhibits on appeal without ever affording the appellees an opportunity to argue
their seemingly substantial objections.
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a decade hence Mr. Justice Douglas for a unanimous Court will render
a decision in North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug
Stores, Inc.,5" which may bear on the meaning of what is now being
discussed.
That decision concerned the fact that:
Petitioner Board denied a permit to Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc.,
because it did not comply with the stock-ownership requirements
of the statute, it appearing that all the common stock of Snyder's
was owned by Red Owl Stores and it not being shown if any Red
Owl shareholders were pharmacists registered and in good stand-
ing in North Dakota. On appeal to the state district court sum-
mary judgment was granted Snyder's. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of North Dakota, that court held that the North Dakota
statute was unconstitutional by reason of our decision in 1928 in
Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105. That case involved a Penn-
sylvania statute that required that 100% of the stock of the cor-
poration be owned by pharmacists. The North Dakota statute,
however, requires only that a majority of the stock be owned by
pharmacists. But the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the
difference did not take this case out from under the Liggett case
because under both statutes control of the corporation having a
pharmacist's license had to be in the hands of pharmacists respon-
sible for the management and operation of the pharmacy. That
court therefore iemanded the case, so that the Board could con-
duct "an administrative hearing on the application, sans the con-
stitutional issue, pursuant to our Administrative Agencies Prac-
tice Act," 202 N.W.2d 140, 145 (italics added).51
And what this Court held was that:
The'majority of the Court in Liggett for which Mr. Justice
Sutherland spoke held that business or property rights could be
regulated under the Fourteenth Amendment only if the "legisla-
tion bears a real and substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or some other phase of the general welfare," 278
U.S., at 111-112. The majority held the Act governing pharmacies
''creates an unreasonable and unnecessary restriction upon private
business." Id., at 113. The opposed view stated by Mr. Justice
Holmes, and concurred in by Mr. Justice Brandeis, was:
"A standing criticism of the use of corporations in business
is that it causes such business to be owned by people who do
not know anything about it. Argument has not been supposed
to be necessary in order to show that the divorce between the
50. 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
51. Id. at 158 (footnote omitted).
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power of control and knowledge is an evil. The selling of drugs
and poisons calls for knowledge in a high degree, and Pennsyl-
vania after enacting a series of other safeguards has provided
that in that matter the divorce shall not be allowed. Of course,
notwithstanding the requirement that in corporations here-
after formed all the stockholders shall be licensed pharmacists,
it still would be possible for a stockholder to content himself
with drawing dividends and to take no hand in the company's
affairs. But obviously he would be more likely to observe the
business with an intelligent eye than a casual investor who
looked only to the standing of the stock in the market. The
Constitution does not make it a condition of preventive legisla-
tion that it should work a perfect cure. It is enough if the ques-
tioned act has a manifest tendency to cure or at least to make
the evil less." Id., at 114-115.
Those two opposed views of public policy are considerations for
the legislative choice. The Liggett case was a creation at war with
the earlier constitutional view of legislative power, Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 132, 134, and opposed to our more recent
decisions. . . .The Liggett case, being a derelict in the stream
of the law, is hereby overruled.6
2
I of course agree with Mr. Justice Douglas' reading of the Munn
decision. Indeed, I specifically pointed out that:
When dealing with such large conceptions as the rights and
duties of property, judges lacking some governing directions are
easily lost in the fog of abstraction. [Chief Justice] Waite's gov-
erning direction was his attitude towards the legislative process.
He did not stop with mere lip service to the cliche, that "if there
is doubt, the expressed will of the legislature should be sustained."
He knew that legislation derives from fact, and that in ascertain-
ing the existence of doubt regarding the validity of legislation, the
basis of judgment is not some abstract presupposition of rights,
but an awareness of the situation which confronted the legisla-
ture. Waite insisted that it was the duty of the Court to indulge
every assumption that there were facts justifying the legislation:
For our purposes we must assume that, if a state of facts could
exist that would justify such legislation, it actually did exist
when the statute now under consideration was passed. For us
the question is one of power, not of expediency. If no state
of circumstances could exist to justify such a statute, then we
may declare this one void, because in excess of the legislative
52. Id. at 166-67.
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power of the State. But if it could, we must presume it did. Of
the propriety of legislative interference within the scope of
legislative power, the legislature is the exclusive judge.53
I nevertheless remain disturbed concerning the possible relevance of
these facts to the situation now before us.
Thus, this Court specifically held in Liggett that "[i]n the light of
the various requirements of the Pennsylvania statutes, it is made clear,
if it were otherwise doubtful, that mere stock ownership in a corpora-
tion, owning and operating a drug store, can have no real or substan-
tial relation to the public health .... ,,54 And in the present case, the
majority does not dispute 5 the dissent's contention that "[t]here is no
health interest here. The question is, as the District Court recognized,
197 F.Supp., at 782-783, a purely economic one: the marketing of
immature avocados, which do not ripen properly after purchase by the
consumer but instead shrivel up and decay, has a substantial adverse
effect on consumer demand for avocados."' 6
Further, this Court in Liggett reversed the decision of a three-judge
court, which had held that:
We, of course, recognize the force of the argument addressed to
us, based upon the distinction between a law which forbade any
one other than a skilled pharmacist to compound medicines, and
another law which forbade any one other than pharmacists to have
a share in the ownership in the business of a drug store. Even here,
however, we are unable to say that there is not a substantial re-
lation of ownership to the public interests. The medicines must
be in the store before they can be dispensed to those who come to
the store for the help which medicines can afford them. What is
there is dictated, not by the judgment of the pharmacist, who
hands it out to customers, but by those who have the financial
control of the business. It may be the Legislature thought that a
corporate owner, in purchasing drugs, might give a greater regard
to the price than to the quality; and, if such was the thought of
the Legislature, can this court say it was without a valid connec-
tion with the public interests, and so unreasonable as to be un-
lawful?G7
53. F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 43, at 84-85, quoting from Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113, 132 (1877).
54. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 113 (1928).
55. See 373 U.S. at 137 n.4.
56. Id. at 168-69 (dissenting opinion).
57. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 22 F.2d 993, 996 (E.D. Pa. 1927).
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Perhaps, then, what the issue before us in No. 45 is, is best sum-
marized by the majority as follows:
[T]here have been suggestions that neither the adoption nor
the application of the California statute reflected any discrim-
inatory or anticompetitive purpose. In some years, California
growers themselves experience great difficulty meeting the oil
content requirement, and sizable shipments must be destroyed...
even though the oil content of mature California avocados in good
years runs substantially above 8% .... Moreover, the California
Growers' Association has regarded its ability to market Florida
fruit during the months when California fruit is not available
as strengthening rather than weakening its own market position.
Plainly the question indicated by these conflicting materials




If that really is the issue before us, I trust it is now clear how im-
portant the decision in Florida Lime Growers v. Jacobsen59 was in
terms of the case and controversy now before us. Thus, there is no
dissent from the holding of the Court that:
In No. 49, the state officers cross-appeal on the ground that the
District Court should have dismissed the action for want of equity,
rather than for lack of merit. Their contention is that there was
insufficient showing of injury to the Florida growers to invoke
the District Court's equity jurisdiction. We reject that conten-
tion, and affirm the judgment insofar as it is challenged by the
cross-appeal.
In Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S.
73, we held that because of the Florida growers' allegations that
California officials had consistently condemned Florida avocados
as unfit for sale in California, "thus requiring appellants [the
Florida growers]-to prevent destruction and complete loss of
their shipments-to reship the avocados to and sell them in other
States," it was evident that "there is an existing dispute between
the parties as to present legal rights amounting to a justiciable
controversy which appellants are entitled to have determined on
the merits." 362 U.S., at 85-86. In view of our mandate in Jacob-
sen, therefore, the District Court necessarily assumed jurisdiction
and heard the case on its merits.60
58. 373 U.S. at 153-54 n.19.
59. 362 U.S. 73 (1960).
60. 373 U.S. at 157.
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I remember Jacobsen rather differently. My dissent, joined by Mr.
Justice Douglas, was based on grounds of judicial efficiency. 61
Nevertheless, I am now troubled by whether I was right to dissent
in Jacobsen. The answer to that question, it seems to me, crucially
involves the meaning of precedent, in which I believe, and which I
believe all judges worthy of the appellation should attempt to follow.0 2
Thus, I was careful to note in Jacobsen that "[m]y adherence to [the]
confining construction of the necessity both for convening three judges
and for this Court to be the first appellate tribunal is consistent with
the approach this Court has taken when it has in the past refused to
apply this legislation."0 3 And I pointed out that in one of the cases I
cited for this proposition, Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, "we
stressed [that] these cases approach this three-judge statute as a pro-
cedural technicality and not as the embodiment of a more or less
broadly phrased social policy the enforcement of which requires a
generous regard for some underlying social purpose." 64
On the other hand, however, the majority did argue that "the cases
since 1925 have continued to maintain the view that if the constitu-
tional claim against the state statute is substantial, a three-judge court
is required to be convened and has jurisdiction, as do we on direct
appeal, over all grounds of attack against the statute."0 5 The first case
it cited for that proposition was Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378.66
61. Cf. Hagans v. Lavine, 94 S. Ct. 1372, 1382-83 (1974), quoted in note 18 supra;
North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 159 (1973):
We are met at the outset with a suggestion that the judgment of the Supreme Court
of North Dakota is not "final" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 ....
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court in Radio Station WOW v. Johnson,
326 U.S. 120, 124, summarized the requirement by Congress that in appeals from
federal district courts as well as in review of state court decisions the judgments
be "final": "This requirement has the support of considerations generally appli-
cable to good judicial administration. It avoids the mischief of economic waste
and of delayed justice. Only in very few situations, where intermediate rulings
may carry serious public consequences, has there been a departure from this re-
quirement of finality for federal appellate jurisdiction ......
62. Compare pp. 1568-69 supra with p. 1556 supra.
63. 362 U.S. at 93 (dissenting opinion).
64. Id. at 94 (dissenting opinion).
65. Id. at 84 (emphasis in original).
66. See also 362 U.S. at 81 n.8 (1960):
In Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, for example, certain state administrative
orders were sought to be enjoined on the ground that they violated both the State
and Federal Constitutions. The Governor of the State had declared martial law in
an effort to enforce the orders, and his action was also challenged on the ground
that any statute purporting to confer such authority on him was in violation of
the State and Federal Constitutions. With regard to the jurisdiction of the three-
judge court which had been convened for the purpose of considering an applica-
tion for injunction, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes said:
"As the validity of provisions of the state constitution and statutes, if they could
be deemed to authorize the action of the Governor, was challenged, the application
for injunction was properly heard by three judges. . . . The jurisdiction of the
1575
The Yale Law Journal
What now troubles me is the question whether I did not underestimate
the importance of Sterling as a precedent.
In that case, "[t]he District Court, composed of three judges . . .
granted an interlocutory injunction restraining the . . . Governor of
the State of Texas .... Adjutant General of the State, and . .. Briga-
dier General of the Texas National Guard, from enforcing their mili-
tary or executive orders regulating or restricting the production of oil
from complainants' wells" 67 and this Court unanimously held:
In the present case, the findings of fact made by the District
Court are fully supported by the evidence. They leave no room
for doubt that there was no military necessity which, from any
point of view, could be taken to justify the action of the Governor
in attempting to limit complainants' oil production, otherwise
lawful. Complainants had a constitutional right to resort to the
federal court to have the validity of the Commission's orders judi-
cially determined. There iuias no exigency which justified the
Governor in attempting to enforce by executive or military order
the restriction which the District Judge had restrained pending
proper judicial inquiry. If it be assumed that the Governor was
entitled to declare a state of insurrection and to bring military
force to the aid of civil authority, the proper use of that power
in this instance was to maintain the federal court in the exercise
of its jurisdiction and not to attempt to override it; to aid in
making its process effective and not to nullify it; to remove, and
not to create, obstructions to the exercise by the complainants of
their rights as judicially declared. 68
Still, analysis of the Jacobsen decision is, of course, useful only
insofar as it can help us to understand the basis for the division among
us concerning the case we presently face.09
District Court so constituted, and of this Court upon appeal, extends to every
question involved, whether of state or federal law, and enables the court to rest
its judgment on the decision of such of the questions as in its opinion effectively
dispose of the case." 287 U.S., at 393-394.
In Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, it was held that a suit by the United
States to enjoin the action of a Governor in interfering with the construction of a
state power project using federal funds was not within [the relevant statute] be-
cause the validity of a state statute or order had not been challenged. Sterling v.
Constantin was distinguished on the ground that it involved an attempt to re-
strain the action of a Governor as part of a main objective to enjoin execution
of certain administrative orders as violative of the State and Federal Constitutions.
As such, Sterling was said to have been "indubitably within [the relevant statute]."
312 U.S., at 253.
67. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 386 (1932).
68. Id. at 40.04.
69. Cf. 362 U.S. at 86:
MR. JusTicE DouGrAs joins in the part of the opinion that passes on the merits,
the Court having held, contrary to his view, that the case is properly here on direct
appeal from a three-judge court.
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As I understand that division, its basis is the majority's view that:
An examination of the operation of these particular marketing
orders reinforces the conclusion we reach from [an] analysis of the
terms and objectives of the [congressional] statute. The regulations
show that the Florida avocado maturity standards are drafted each
year not by impartial experts in Washington or even in Florida,
but rather by the South Florida Avocado Administrative Commit-
tee, which consists entirely of representatives of the growers and
handlers concerned. It appears that the Secretary of Agriculture
has invariably adopted the Committee's recommendations for
maturity dates, sizes, and weights. Thus the pattern which emerges
is one of maturity regulations drafted and administered locally
by the growers' own representatives, and designed to do no more
than promote orderly competition among the South Florida
growers.70
The dissent, on the other hand, stresses that:
The State may have a legitimate economic interest in the sub-
ject matter, but it is adequately served by the federal regulations
and this interest would be but slightly impaired, if at all, by the
supersession of § 792.
[footnote] It is suggested that the regulations involved here are
"simply schemes for regulating competition among growers . . .
initiated and administered by the growers and shippers them-
selves." From this proposition it is in some way reasoned that
"the self-help standards of this marketing program" should not be
deemed to preclude application of state law which conflicts with
and interferes with the operation of the comprehensive federal
marketing program. The "simply" part of the proposition over-
looks, however, the fact that these are the Secretary's regulations,
promulgated under congressional authority. It also overlooks the
Secretary's extensive supervisory powers and his statutory duty
*.. to insure that regulations be carried on "in the public interest."
And no case has been cited to us which indicates that the delega-
tion to the regulatees of the power to propose regulations in the
first instance violates any provision of general law.71
70. 373 U.S. at 150-51 (footnotes omitted).
71. Id. at 177 & n.20 (dissenting opinion). See also id. at 169 (dissenting opinion):
Despite the repeated suggestions to this effect in the Court's opinion, there is no
indication that the state regulatory scheme has any purpose other than protecting
the good will of the avocado industry-such as protecting health or preventing
deception of the public-unless as a purely incidental by-product. Similar findings
on damage to the industry because some growers marketed immature avocados are
contained in the United States Department of Agriculture order which preceded the
issuance of the federal regulations. . . . These two regulatory schemes have precisely
the same purpose, which is purely an economic one; they seek to achieve it, how-
ever, by applying different tests to the same avocados.
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Given my belief in precedent, what comes to mind when delegation
is mentioned is the decision in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan. That
case involved the question whether a statutory provision which "pur-
ports to authorize the President to pass a prohibitory law" 72 consti-
tuted "an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. ' 73
I recognize, of course, that Mr. Justice Douglas regards the era of
this institution's history during which Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan
was handed down as productive of "derelict[s] in the stream of the
law.' 74 I observe, however, that Mr. Justice Douglas noted, not too
long ago, that "[s]ince we start with an exercise by an American citizen
of an activity included in constitutional protection, we will not readily
infer that Congress gave the Secretary of State unbridled discretion to
grant or withhold it." 75 He cited Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan for
the proposition that "if that power is delegated, the standards must
be adequate to pass scrutiny by the accepted tests."
76
D
Since I at one time agreed77 with the concern for judicial efficiency
expressed by the dissent in the case before us that "[i]n view of the
Court's disposition of the matter today, it is probable that this case
like a revenant will return to us within another few Terms with a
still more copious record,"78 I am compelled to inform you that, a
decade hence, a three-judge federal district court will write:
Were it not for the United States Supreme Court decision in
Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 112 [sic] (1963), we
would conclude that: the application of [the relevant section of
the] California Agricultural Code . . . to Florida avocados pre-
viously certified as mature under the Federal Marketing Order,
violates the Supremacy Clause.79
The application of the California statute to Florida avocados dis-
72. 293 U.S. 388, 414 (1935).
73. Id.
74. See pp. 1571-72 supra.
75. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958).
76. Id.
77. Cf. Lurk v. United States, 366 U.S. 712, 714 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., whom Harlan
9- Stewart, JJ., join, dissenting):
Nothing could be more obvious than that the Court of Appeals, no matter how it
may decide the question now put in its keeping, will have it only temporarily. The
inevitable final destination of the case is this Court. Decision here should not be
delayed by wastefully time-consuming remand to the Court of Appeals of a ques-
tion that is already before us.
78. 373 U.S. at 159 (dissenting opinion).
79. J.R. Brooks & Son, Inc. v. Reagan, Civ. No. C-71-1311 SC, at 17-18 (N.D. Cal.,
Sept. 18, 1973).
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criminates against Florida avocados and unreasonably burdens in-
terstate marketing of Florida avocados in violation of the Com-
merce Clause.8 0
And, more importantly, that court will find, as fact:
In the fall of 1963, when California's Bureau of Standardization
relaxed inspection standards and permitted the entry of some
Florida avocados when the samples tested averaged less than 8
percent oil, the California industry brought immediate pressure
on the State to enforce the 8 percent standard against "all imported
avocados" to protect the California growers from competition, and
obtained a commitment from the State that such a policy would
be implemented."'
In 1968, a provision was added to the California Administrative
Code, purportedly to enforce the 8 percent statute, to the effect
that, if any single avocado in a lot tested less than 7 percent oil,
the entire lot would be rejected. 2
What these findings present is the possibility that the length of de-
lay in judicial resolution of the controversy before us will be the re-
sult of administrative action. Given this possibility, it seems to me not
unimportant that the majority notes, after its analysis of the 1925
statute, that "[n]evertheless it may be that the continued application
of this regulation to Florida avocados has imposed an unconstitutional
burden on commerce, or has discriminated against another State's ex-
ports of the particular commodity."8 3
Indeed, it is this possibility that causes me to ponder the dangers
presented by administrators, the meaning of which may not have been
clear to me a generation ago. The dangers I refer to are the absence
of the checks provided for the judiciary by the existence of public
opinions and the possibility of dissents84 and the effects of the lack
of institutional competition for public acceptance resulting from the
fact that administrators are part of the Executive rather than members
of a separate but equal department of government.8
80. Id. at 18.
81. Id. at 8.
82. Id.
83. 373 U.S. at 153-54.
84. "Divisions on the Court and the greater clarity of view and candor of expression
to which they give rise, are especially productive of insight." F. FRANKFURTER, supra
note 43, at 9. "The scope of a Supreme Court decision is not infrequently revealed
by the candor of dissent." Id. at 106.
85. In Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911), the Congress had passed a bill
granting jurisdiction to the Court of Claims and Supreme Court on appeal, to hear the
named parties plaintiff, with the United States to pay their expenses from a trust fund
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As to the relevance of these differences between judges and adminis-
trators to the issues before us, I should like to call to your attention
an article in the Wall Street Journal of December 17, 1973, headlined
"Fading Dream: Common Market Delay On Oil Decision Signals
Slowing of Unity Drive,"8' 0 which states, inter alia:
The German-led group of seven members and the Brussels Com-
mission staff saw their mission as nothing less than saving the
European Economic Community-the formal name of the Com-
mon Market. The very name would become a hollow mockery,
they feared, if the Community didn't seize the opportunity to
allocate each member a fair share of oil. Even free-trading Ger-
many would throw up protective barriers against French Re-
naults, the reasoning went, if France were afloat in oil while
Volkswagen slashed output for want of fuel to make or drive cars.
Against the backdrop of scant movement toward European uni-
ty lately, even the general expression of intent to deal with prob-
lems "in a concerted manner" was enough to leave the Germans
if the acts of Congress they contested were found unconstitutional. The Court held
that jurisdiction was lacking in the Supreme Court because of lack of a bona fide
case or controversy, and in the Court of Claims because the act giving the two courts
jurisdiction was not separable.
The very inarticulateness of the Muskrat decision in attempting to explain why that
situation was not cognizable by the Court is an indication of the great importance
the Court attaches to safeguarding its status vis-h-vis the other branches of the federal
government. Muskrat may be said to stand for the proposition that the Court will not
act at the specific behest of the Congress and thus abandon part of its freedom not
to decide inopportune questions. See generally Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term
-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). Professor Bickel notes two
of the most important aspects of Muskrat: it was thoroughly concrete and adversary,
despite the Court's contentions, and it is frequently cited with approval. Id. at 45 &
n.25. Cf. Note, Legislative and Constitutional Courts: What Lurks Ahead for Bifurcation,
71 YALE L.J. 979, 999 n.139 (1962); note 77 supra. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. at 92-93 (dissenting opinion):
Were only these considerations claiming judgment in construing inert language
it would plainly follow, as the Court has concluded, that three judges are required
to hear the complaint in this case, for constitutional claims are made and it is
not precluded that injunctive relief may be granted on an obvious conf'ict with
specific constitutional provisions. But so to rule here is in my view to fail to give
due regard to countervailing considerations of far-reaching consequences to the
federal judicial system, affecting the functioning of district and circuit courts, as
well as of this Court. Specifically, the convening of a three-judge trial court makes
for dislocation of the normal structure and functioning of the lower federal courts,
particularly in the vast non-metropolitan regions; and direct review of District
Court judgments by this Court not only expands this Court's obligatory jurisdic-
tion but contradicts the dominant principle of having this Court review decisions
only after they have gone through two judicial sieves, or, in the case of federal
regulatory legislation, through the administrative tribunal and a Court of Appeals.
86. [Editors' note] The Common Market, not unlike the United States in the early
nineteenth century, faces the task of creating a unified economic system out of a col-
lection of diverse states accustomed to autonomous decisions. See pp. 1569-70 supra;
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). The decisionmakers, however, are ad.
ministrators, not judges. Their recent oil decisions threaten, as the last sentence in the
passage indicates, to undermine their legitimacy.
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and Dutch publicly pleased. This was true even though the British
and the French could contend that they hadn't given anything
away. It may take at least the two and one half months they have
allowed themselves before anyone knows which view will prove to
be correct ...
Before the real crisis came along, the Common Market had
gotten down to distinctly unexciting tasks. Tariffs among the
original six members (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxem-
bourg and Holland) are already abolished, and tariffs with the
new ones (Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark) are being phased
out. So the Brussels "Eurocrats" have had to turn to tinkering
with intricate farm-price props and to tackling technical barriers
to free trade. Their "harmonization" proposals, however, seem to
have united Europeans mainly in outraged opposition to what's
seen at the grass roots as threats to national ways of life.87
What I am now troubled by is, in short, the possibility that I may
not have had enough faith in the efficacy of precedent: the importance
of the difference between acting as a judge and acting as an adminis-
trator ss Thus, I was aware in 1927 concerning the institution de-
nominated Commerce Court that:
As was true of the Interstate Commerce Commission itself in
earlier days, the Commerce Court encountered numerous rever-
sals by the Supreme Court on so-called questions of jurisdiction.
What was merely a permissible resolution of doubt, largely in-
herent in the situation or in the ambiguities of legislation, with
a corrective process available in the Supreme Court, was inter-
preted by popular feeling, ill-equipped fairly to judge these tech-
nical issues, as a conscious attempt on the part of the Commerce
87. Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1973, at 1, col. 1. Compare id. with pp. 1569-70 supra. Cf.
p. 1574 supra.
88. See 373 U.S. at 165 n.ll (dissenting opinion):
"There is not-and from the very nature of the problem there cannot be-any
rigid formula or rule which can be used as a universal pattern to determine the
meaning and purpose of every act of Congress. This Court, in considering the
validity of state laws in the light of . .. federal laws touching the same subject,
has made use of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the
field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment;
and interference. But none of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional
test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no
one crystal clear distinctly marked formula. Our primary function is to determine
whether, under the circumstances of this particular case, Pennsylvania's law stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and ob-
jectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67. (Emphasis added.)
See also North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156,
160 (1973):
rA]s [Mr. Justice Frankfurter writing for the Court in Radio Station WOW v.
Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124] pointed out, [the] concept of "finality" has a "penumbral
area."
Compare pp. 1568-69 supra with p. 1556 supra. Cf. note 49 supra.
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Court to usurp authority. To reversals on jurisdictional grounds
were added reversals on substantive questions, and, unfortunately,
questions full of dramatic interest around which clustered strong
popular emotions. Everything combined to make the Court, and
that very quickly, a battered bark.8 9
But did I really grasp the importance of the fact that the Commerce
Court was an agency dealing with a sharply delimited set of commer-
cial problems rather than a court of general jurisdiction, or did I
think that all of the battering was attributable solely to the fact that
"[t]he technique of administration, the qualifications of administra-
tors, the scope of judicial review, in a word, the key issues in any
fruitful scheme of utility regulation have hardly begun to emerge
as pressing problems for scientific judgment"? 0
E
Given all of the foregoing, what ultimately disturbs me concerning
No. 45 is the response we will give when J. R. Brooks & Son, Inc.
v. Reagan9l is appealed to us. In particular, what will we say to the
findings of fact? The district court found:
Since 1925, and intensifying in more recent years, the California
8 percent oil content requirement has been maintained and ap-
plied against Florida-grown avocados, as the result of pressure
from the California avocado industry, for the purpose, inter alia,
of excluding competition from Florida avocados in California
markets.
9 2
The California 8 percent oil content statute has been main-
tained and applied to operate, and in fact has operated, as an
embargo against Florida-grown avocados. 93
The California 8 percent oil content statute has been main-
tained to protect the California grower and packer from competi-
tion. The statute has caused higher avocado prices to California
consumers by preventing the sale of competitive Florida fruit. 4
In 1927, a bill was introduced in the California Legislature
which would have provided that avocados of the West Indian
Trapp variety would be saleable in California at 5 percent oil
and that other West Indians would be saleable at 7 percent oil.
89. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN
THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 164 (1928) (footnote omitted).
90. Id. at 173. Cf. notes 34, 35 supra.
91. Civ. No. C-71-1311 SC (N.D. Cal., Sept. 18, 1973).




Vol. 83: 1553, 1974
Precedent and Adjudication
This bill was not passed as a result of pressure by the California
avocado industry, which was motivated by a fear of increased
Florida competition. 95
In 1958, a hearing before a subcommittee of the State of Cali-
fornia Joint Legislative Committee on Agricultural and Livestock
Problems was held in Vista, California, with the purpose of deter-
mining whether the California 8 percent oil statute should be
lowered for certain summer varieties of California avocados. The
8 percent statute was not changed at that time for fear of allowing
additional Florida competition.9
How will we justify our decision in light of the finding of fact
that the relevant section of the California Agricultural Code "arbi-
trarily and unreasonably burdens interstate commerce in Florida avo-
cados by imposing a standard which is irrational as applied to Florida
avocados ... ,,?o
Perhaps, after all, my retirement was not without its rewards. On
the other hand, however, perhaps this Court will not have to render
yet another decision in this matter. And as you all know, I had a law
clerk whose book9" details how crucial that possibility is to the suc-
cessful functioning of this institution.99
III. Coda
(1) The choice among competing grounds of decision is not only
a choice among past precedents (or the meaning to be assigned them)
but is, most importantly, a choice about the kind and scope of the
precedent being created.
(2) This must depend on an assessment of the future relevance of
that decision, because only a successful anticipation of social evolution
95. Id.
96. Id. at 7-8.
97. Id. at 16. See also p. 1568 & note 34 supra.
98. A. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLrICS (1962). See also p. 1568 supra; Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Prin-
ciple and Economic Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1967). Cf. Smith v. Cahoon,
283 U.S. 553 (1931), in which the Florida legislature exempted carriers of farm products
and certain seafoods from a statute requiring security from carriers for hire to cover
injuries caused by their negligence. A claim that the Equal Protection Clause had been
violated was upheld, not on the basis that carriers of farm produce could never be
given special treatment by the legislature, not because the classification was an in-
herently suspect one, but on the ground that such special treatment could not be
afforded in the context of a statute purporting to protect the public against negligent
carriers. Compare id. with Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Toward a Model
of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1973).
99. [Editors' note] See Deutsch, supra note 1, at 233-35.
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(both in the fact patterns it will churn up and the attitudes and mores
it will embody) will confer legitimacy on the court's decision.
(3) The reader has been taken through arrangements of facts, and
from a differently organized view, taken through them again in detail.
This is a trying process, but it is the only process appropriate to my
argument.
(4) What then is the lesson of the Fable? If the point of the ex-
ercise is the meaning of precedent, I think the lesson is two-staged:
the importance of temporal context has the implications that, as we
use precedent, it cannot be sprung from its context, and, as we create
precedent, by the choice among theoretically possible grounds of de-
cision, we must attempt to anticipate future relevance. Relevant prec-
edent is nothing more and nothing less than both perceived as a ra-
tional solution to a set of issues occurring at a given time and a de-
velopment perceived as a significant contribution to a just future.
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